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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE EFFICIENT
ALLOCATION OF SOCIAL SURPLUS FROM CREATION
MICHELE BOLDRIN AND DAVID K. LEVINE
Abstract. In the modern theory of innovation, monopoly plays a crucial role
both as a cause and an eﬀect of creative economic activity. Innovative ﬁrms, it
is argued, would have insuﬃcient incentive to innovate should the prospect of
monopoly power not be present. This theme of monopoly runs throughout the
theory of growth, international trade, and industrial organization. We argue
that monopoly is neither needed for, nor a necessary consequence of innova-
tion. In particular, intellectual property is not necessary for, and may hurt
more than help, innovation and growth. We show that, in most circumstances,
competitive rents allow creative individuls to appropriate a large enough share
of the social surplus generated by their innovations to compensate for their
opportunity cost. We also show that, as the number of pre-existing and IP
protected ideas needed for an innovation increases, the equilibrium outcome
under the IP regime is one of decreasing probability of innovation, while this
is not the case without IP. Finally, we provide various examples of how com-
petitive markets for innovative products would work in the absence of IP and
critically discuss a number of common fallacies in the previous literature.
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1. Introduction
We discuss positive and normative issues related to the appropriation of the sur-
plus generated by creative activity. We take for granted that an act of creation
generates a positive total net surplus, i.e. that the total opportunity cost of the
inputs is less than the social value of the output, and try to understand: (i) How
such surplus is allocated between creators, imitators, and consumers as a function
of two diﬀerent systems of property rights, and of the consequently diﬀerent mar-
ket structures; (ii) Which, among the two allocations of surplus, maximizes social
welfare and, hence, which system of property rights and which market structure are
socially desirable. We label the two property right systems considered, respectively,
IP and NIP.
Under IP, as is currently the case in most advanced countries, legislation at-
tributes to the creator of an idea the right to impose substantial, and essentially
unlimited, restrictions on the usage that lawful buyers of copies of the idea are
allowed to undertake after the purchase takes place; in particular, no one can make
further copies of the idea without permission from the creator. Under NIP, creators
own the copies of their idea they either produce or acquire, but cannot impose re-
strictions on the usage that lawful buyers of copies of their ideas can undertake;
in particular, buyers of copies are allowed to make further copies by using existing
technologies. Under the IP system of property rights, the market structure is mo-
nopolistic and the creator is, de facto, an eternal (for copyrightable materials) or an
almost eternal (for patents) monopolist. Under the NIP system of property rights,46 MICHELE BOLDRIN AND DAVID K. LEVINE
the market structure may be monopolistic in the very few initial periods, if there is
a unique creator who is then a natural monopolist, but becomes competitive in the
sequel. In our modeling exercise, in order to allow for the frequent and important
case of multiple simultaneous creators, we will assume competition from the very
ﬁrst period under NIP, and consider the particular case in which the creator is
initially a natural monopolist as an extension.
The analytical part of the paper contains the following items. We introduce a
model of innovation based on a set of assumptions that, as argued in the example
of the next Section, are the fundamental characterizing features of creative activity.
For this model, we derive the equilibrium under the NIP system and characterize
its properties, including the case in which the creator is a natural monopolist in
the ﬁrst period. After brieﬂy mentioning a few extensions, we compare the NIP
allocation with the one that obtains in the IP system, under the same assumption
for preferences and technology. Next we revisit the standard model of innovation,
in which no innovation takes place under NIP. While these may not be, and are
not in our view, the empirically relevant circumstances, they are those almost in-
variably adopted to argue for the necessity of strong IP legislation. Even in these
special circumstances, our analysis casts abundant doubts on the established wis-
dom, according to which more IP protection is, from a social viewpoint, always
better than less. Further on, we show by means of a simple example that in a
paradigmatic (and everyday more frequent) case the presence of IP protection may
eventually lead to an ever decreasing amount of creation; the paradigmatic case
consisting of a situation in which the creator of a new idea must use previous ideas,
controlled by previous creators/monopolists, in the inventive process. Finally, we
use our model of creative activity to illustrate how “superstars” arise when the
technology to reproduce ideas becomes more eﬃcient. This allows us to show, even
if this should not be the concern of a policy aimed at maximizing social welfare,
that a NIP system would not necessarily “impoverish” creative individuals, but
instead it would allow the best among them to still earn large amounts of money.
In fact, we show, incomes disproportionally larger than those of other (slightly less
talented) creators accrue in the NIP equilibrium to the best creators. In the IP
allocation, this “disproportion” between relative income and relative talent only
increases, making income inequality larger without gains for social welfare. Before
summing up we revert to the “purely verbal” mode and discuss a number of com-
mon fallacies often encountered in the literature supporting strong IP regimes. In
the conclusion we summarize our ﬁndings, debate a few other controversial points,
and claim that an almost complete abolition of IP protection would lead to more
creative activity, a more eﬃcient allocation of its surplus, and higher social welfare.
1.1. Relation with Previous Literature. What we refer to as the “standard
model” assumes that innovations involve a ﬁxed cost of creation and a constant
marginal cost of reproduction, that the new idea or creation is not embodied in
anything the creator owns and controls or, at least, that it can be imitated and
copied by third parties at no cost other than the marginal cost of reproduction,
without additional revenue accruing to the original creator because of this copying
activity. In other words, the standard model assumes that, once invented, the idea
is tantamount to a public good upon which the original innovator would have no
control if IP protection were absent. In these circumstances the creator could only
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without any ability of earning additional rents and, thereby, without the possibility
of recovering the original ﬁxed cost. This model is so widespread and so frequently
used that it is hard to pinpoint its exact origin; some passages in Arrow (1962) may
have provided it a theoretical foundation, even if it is probably more appropriate to
attribute the basic idea that “monopoly is good, indeed necessary, for innovation,”
to the Schumpeter of Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. A classical treatment,
arguing that the current (at the time) IP system is the optimal one, can be found in
Nordhaus (1969), while Romer (1986) and the new growth literature that followed
it are certainly the most recent and successful among its theoretical developments.
Without doubt we are not the ﬁrst to question the appropriateness of the IP
regime for fostering creation and innovation even if, to the best of our knowledge, no
one had argued that it applies in general and to most innovations and, again to the
best of our knowledge, no formal dynamic general equilibrium theory of competitive
innovation had been submitted before Boldrin and Levine (1999). We hasten to
add, though, that we view our work as a straightforward application to the issue of
innovative activity of classical capital theory and, in particular, of the Marshallian
theory of competitive rents under limited capacity. The fundamental point we make
is that classical competitive theory applies to ideas, and their copies, the same way it
applies to wheat, and its copies. Plant (1934) and Stigler (1956) are two illustruous
predecessors, who argued the same point verbally, but not less forcefully, a long
time before us; Stigler (1956), in particular, contains a penetrating and convincing
discussion of competitive innovation that should be mandatory reading for every
researcher in the ﬁeld.
In more recent years, a number of authors have argued, more or less informally
or on the basis of empirical research, that ease of copying by third parties does not
necessarily prevent creators of literary or artistic works from collecting substantial
revenue. This point has been made, for example, in the literature on copying (Be-
sen and Kirby (1989), Liebowitz (1985), Johnson (1985)), and sharing (Ordover
and Willig (1978)). An excellent and updated survey of this and related literature,
cum critical discussion, can be found in Legros (2005). The basic message of these
articles is, nevertheless, diﬀerent from the one advocated here, both in the formal
setup and in the substantive conclusions. Liebowitz (1985), for example, carries
out an econometric study of the impact of photocopying on the revenue of journal
publishers, to conclude, on the basis of his empirical estimates, that through means
such “as indirect appropriability, exposure eﬀects, and price discrimination” pub-
lishers’ revenue may actually have increased due to the advent of photocopying. In
all these works, the model adopted, or the underlying framework of reasoning in
the case of empirical work, is the standard one, with ﬁxed costs, increasing returns
to scale, and a monopolistic innovator who can actively set prices and discriminate
between diﬀerent buyers. Further, there is no modeling of the dynamic of creation
and reproduction, of the decision problem faced by potential innovators, and of
the way in which diﬀerent market structures determine diﬀerent allocations of the
surplus and, hence, diﬀerent incentives to create. These are the issues we address
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2. Embodiment of Ideas and Surplus Appropriation
Before moving on to the mathematical part, we illustrate verbally the basic
intuitions underlying our analysis, using a well-known historical example to ﬁx
ideas.
Economic, and more generally social, progress is the long run, and altogether sur-
prising, result of the continuous creation of new commodities, of their free exchange
among individuals, and of the competition among producers of diﬀerent goods, be
they creators or imitators. Economists have long realized that there would be but a
slow and possibly inconsequential improvement in human living standards without
sustained innovation. This point was argued, most forcefully, by Joseph Schum-
peter in The Theory of Economic Development (1911). With constant technology
and a constant set of goods, the process of capital accumulation, when based only
on the saving of a share of the yearly income ﬂow, would generate but a fraction
of the growth in per capita income we have witnessed since the inception of human
history. Accumulation of capital under a constant technology, history and common
sense conjure to suggest, cannot go very far due to the presence of ﬁxed resources
and the diminishing returns they bring about. Innovation is the engine of change
and economic development, hence understanding its nature, internal mechanisms,
and the social and institutional factors that bring it about or impede it, is, we
believe, the single most important problem faced by the social sciences. It is our
contention that understanding innovation is tantamount to understanding compe-
tition, that the latter is a necessary condition for the former and that, under very
general circumstances, it is also suﬃcient. If innovation is the ﬂow that enriches us
all, then competition is the spring from which it erupts.
Innovation, for us, is the creation of the ﬁrst copy of a good/process/idea that
did not exist before. As the word “idea” will be used henceforth to denote all
innovations, its usage should be brieﬂy clariﬁed. In our terminology, Isaac Net-
won’s innovation did not consist just in “thinking” the gravitational laws, but in
the process of embodying them in his mind ﬁrst, and in formulas and written ex-
positions later. When, in 1687, he completed the manuscript of his Philosophiae
Naturalis Principia Mathematica and had it published, “Newton’s innovation” was
completed. All subsequent copies of the Principia were reproductions of that ﬁrst
copy of his idea, and they were produced with a technology diﬀerent from the one
he had to use to obtain his ﬁrst manuscript. Notice, that with “copy” here we refer
here to either a physical copy of the actual book or the (equally physical, if less
visible) copy of the gravitational laws embodied in the brain of another scientist or
layman, i.e. a piece of socially valuable human capital. Indeed, and this is some-
thing crucial, the social value of Newton’s innovation is more properly measured
by the number of copies of his laws existing in the second form (actual human
capital) than in the ﬁrst (copies of the book.) All such copies stemmed from New-
ton’s original copy and the social value of the latter would have been much smaller,
or even negligible, without them. Newton’s reward, either in terms of intellectual
prestige or in terms of actual wealth and social status, became so high because
very many copies (of either type) of the Principia were eventually reproduced. In
our terminology, the ﬁrst copy of the gravitational laws is the “prototype” and it
embodies, for the ﬁrst time, Newton’s idea; the innovation technology is the one
Newton adopted to ﬁgure out the gravitational laws and write the Principia. The
imitation technology is the one used by subsequent publishers of the book and byIP AND THE EFFICIENT ALLOCATION OF SOCIAL SURPLUS FROM CREATION 49
whoever learned and understood the content of the Principia. Notice, which is
relevant, that the Principia were published before the Statute of Anne introduced
some (weak by current standard) degree of IP legislation in the U.K.
Notice that the ﬁnal products of the two technologies are, functionally speaking,
equivalent: a copy of the Principia is a copy of the Principia, and a human that
understands the principles and laws of gravitation is, at least from this narrow
point of view, equivalent to any other human who understands the same principles
and laws. This point will become relevant later on, when discussing the public
domain for ideas. Notice also that both technologies use a variety of inputs to
obtain their ﬁnal product, that some of these inputs are previous innovations (e.g.
Kepler’s Laws) and that such inputs can be acquired on competitive markets under
NIP, but would have to be obtained from monopolists by acquiring many licenses
under IP. There are two exceptions, to what we just said. First, the innovation
technology uses a particularly scarce input, Newton’s geniality in this case, which
greatly limits the number of initial prototypes that can be obtained. Had we been
concerned with a less dramatic invention, simultaneous creation by a number of
diﬀerent and independent innovators would have been likely, as it is often the case
in practice. Still, the total amount of “creative ability” available at any point in
time to make prototypes of a new ides is quite limited. In the jargon of economics,
there is always limited creative capacity of prototypes at any given point in time.
In the particular case of scientiﬁc inventions or of artistic creation, this limitation
of creative capacity may persist for a long time: new scientiﬁc discoveries are very
diﬃcult to understand, that is why we have Ph.D. programs and post-docs, and
live performances of, say, new hard to imitate music, which is why live concerts
are often sold out and very expensive. The imitation technology also uses a special
kind of input, and that is a pre-existing copy of the Principia (in case we are
considering a publisher making copies of the book) or, generally, someone who
has already understood its content (in case we are considering a student learning
gravitational laws). Either way, this particular input(s) is also in limited supply;
strictly speaking, this is true at any point in time and even now, but it is especially
true in periods close to the time in which the ﬁrst prototype of the Principia
appeared. In summary, the imitation technology also faces a limited productive
capacity, the size of which is basically determined by the number of copies of the
idea “Newton’s Gravitational Laws” embodied in humans/books at any point in
time.
A little reﬂection shows that this set of properties is not speciﬁc to the partic-
ular case of the Principia, but applies quite widely (we would say: universally) to
other innovations. The diﬀerences are quantitative, never qualitative: new valuable
ideas are always embodied in either people or things; innovative capacity is always
limited; imitation/reproduction always requires copies of the idea and hence stems
from the original prototype even if in some rare cases imitation may not require
large investments; reproductive capacity is also quite limited for a substantial num-
ber of periods after the innovation takes place; new ideas almost always require
old ideas to be created, and creation is more and more a complex and cumulative
incremental process; ﬁnally, consumers are always impatient and would rather have
the stuﬀ today than tomorrow. Our theoretical analysis builds upon such proper-
ties, and an additional one: it took quite a while to Newton to come up with the
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longer to fully articulate them in the manuscript of the Principia. Further, the
Principia were not a minor, inﬁnitesimal departure from or improvement upon
previous knowledge, but a substantial one indeed. This property is also general, at
least qualitatively! Producing the prototype, via the invention technology, requires
quite often a large investment, which we want to think of as an indivisibility. While
it is not true that a sizeable indivisibility is involved with the production of pro-
totypes of every idea, it is true that this is often the case, and that this feature of
creative activity should be taken in proper account when discussing the allocation
of economic surplus from creative activity.
Finally, a few words to further clarify our approach to the problem. We ask
what is socially optimal, and how incentives should be provided (i.e. which market
structure can provide the appropriate incentives) for the socially optimal amount of
creative activity to take place. The problem of providing incentives for innovation
should not be confused with the protection of rents of intermediaries, or rents of
established artists, or creators more generally. The issue here is not what makes
creators richer or as rich as possible, but how to allocate to them enough of the sur-
plus from creative activity so that they have the incentive to carry it out eﬃciently,
from a social view point. This requires focusing on the concept of opportunity cost,
i.e. to ask: when a potential innovator considers the choice between engaging in
creative activity or doing something else, his opportunity cost is determined by how
much income he would receive from doing something else. Eﬃciency requires that,
should the innovator opt for creation, he receive from the latter at least as much as
he would receive from the alternative activity, that is: his opportunity cost. When
the market structures allows the innovator to receive more than his opportunity
cost, this additional rent serves no socially useful purpose. Per se, this additional
rent may just be a pure transfer, which does not aﬀect economic eﬃciency; never-
theless, more often than not, and in particular when monopoly power is involved,
this additional rent accrues to the innovator because he has the incentive to pro-
vide less innovations, or less copies of his innovations, than socially eﬃcient. In
this case the additional rent is not just a neutral transfer from consumers to inno-
vators (which may be unfair, but irrelevant for eﬃciency) but a socially costly and
ineﬃcient tax on consumers, less copies of ideas are available to the people than
it is desirable and technologically feasible. Our critique of current IP laws focuses
mainly on this second aspect.
Technological innovation continuously change the opportunity cost and reserva-
tion values of the various agents involved in creation. So, for example, the invention
of the printing press made the craftsmanship accumulated over century of artisans
and monks unnecessary for copying or for production of new books. This was a
blessing, for writers of books and their readers, but also a curse for those artisans
who suddenly lost their long established title to a substantial share of the social
value of every book, new or old that it be. Given current technologies, and the
continuous improvement in the innovation and reproduction technologies, it would
be crucial to measure what the opportunity costs of creators and innovators actu-
ally is. Unfortunately, this is an endeavor to which applied economists, especially
in the area of industrial organization, have dedicated minimal attention and we are
not aware of any study estimating the minimum future expected income needed to
attract potential innovators into creative activity.IP AND THE EFFICIENT ALLOCATION OF SOCIAL SURPLUS FROM CREATION 51
3. A Model of Creation
3.1. Creation under Perfect Competition. To understand whether an inno-
vation will take place or not in a NIP (or competitive) environment, we must
understand how much a new idea is worth after it is created. Consider a compet-
itive environment in which some innovation has already been produced. In other
words, there are currently some prototypes, books, songs, or blueprints owned by
the creator. There may be many independent creators, as simultaneous inventions
are allowed by our theory. To simplify, and without loss of generality, assume
there is a continuum of identical creators, all of which behave competitively in the
market for the new good, i.e., in analogy with traditional growth models, consider
the case of a “representative competitive innovator.” Again for simplicity, focus on
the extreme case where every subsequent item produced using the template is a
perfect substitute for the template itself – that is, what is socially valuable about
the invention is entirely embodied in the product. At a moment in time, each
item has two alternative uses: it may be consumed or it may be used to produce
additional copies. For simplicity we assume that while the process of copying is
time consuming, there is no other cost of producing copies beside the cost of (par-
tially) withdrawing from consumption the goods that are used as templates in the
reproduction process. The analysis that follows makes it transparent that adding a
vector x of other, competitively marketed, inputs to the reproduction process only
complicates the algebra without altering the conclusions.
Speciﬁcally, suppose that currently the innovators have made k > 0 units of
the new product available. These units can be sold on a competitive markets, and
purchasers can either consume them or invest them as inputs to make further copies.
Obviously, innovators can also participate as purchasers in the market, as long as
they remain price takers on either side of the market. Suppose that 0 ≤ c ≤ k
units are allocated to consumption, leaving k −c units available for the production
of copies. The k − c units that are copied result in β(k − c) copies available in the
following period, where β > 1. Because the units of the good used in consumption
might be durable, there are ζc additional units available next period. In many cases
ζ < 1 due to depreciation, however we allow the possibility that the good may be
reproduced while being consumed, and require only that ζ < β, reproducing while
consuming is not easier than just reproducing.
Besides the representative innovator, there is also an inﬁnitely lived represen-
tative consumer, who receives a utility of u(ct) from consumption in each period,
where u is strictly increasing, concave, and bounded below, and who has a discount
factor 0 < δ < 1. We assume that the technology and preferences are such that
feasible utility is bounded above. Given the initial stock of prototypes k0 this de-
ﬁnes a simple model of capital accumulation under competition in the presence of
a linear technology (again, linearity is not essential.) It is well known that com-
petitive equilibria are Pareto optima under these conditions, hence the equilibrium
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It is well known that the solution to this optimization problem may be charac-
terized by a concave value function v(k0), which is the unique solution of
v(k) = max{u(c) + δv(βk − (β − ζ)c)}
subject to 0 ≤ c ≤ k.
In an inﬁnite horizon setting, beginning with the initial stock of the new good
k0 = k we may use this program recursively to compute the optimal kt for all
subsequent t. Moreover, the solution of this problem may be decentralized as a
competitive equilibrium, in which the price of consumption services in period t is




If ζ is large enough relative to β it may be optimal not to invest at all and to
reproduce solely by consuming. We ﬁrst take the case where consumption is strictly
less than capital in every period. By standard dynamic programming arguments,
the price qt of the durable good kt can be computed as
qt = v0(kt) = pt
β
β − ζ
This is positive and, when either the current value of consuming the idea is
very high (high pt), or the reproduction rate is very high, or the durability of the
good embodying the idea very close to the reproduction rate, the NIP price of a
copy of the idea is also very high. Notice that q0 is, under NIP, the total earnings
accruing to the initial innovator(s) for each prototype they sell in the, supposedly
competitive, market for prototypes. The zero proﬁt condition, also implied by NIP
and competition, implies that qt decreases at a rate of 1
β per period of time, hence
ideas that are hard to reproduce sell at substantial prices for a long time.
This already proves the main point: innovators, even in the presence of simulta-
neous innovations by many independent agents, can earn positive rents when selling
their new product under conditions of perfect competition. This is due, crucially,
to the fact that it takes time to produce additional copies of the new good, and that
the initial k0 copies determine a capacity constraint on feasible consumption in the
ﬁrst and in all subsequent periods. This provides the foundation for a theory of
competitive innovation under NIP. It is readily apparent that this is true as long as
at least one of the following two assumptions holds, (i) there is a delay in production
(i.e., consumers are impatient), (ii) capacity is bounded at all points in time (i.e.,
k0 < ∞ and β < ∞.) What remains to be checked, and will be discussed momen-
tarily, is how the parameters of the model determine the size of the rents accruing
to the competitive innovators. Notice that, while the innovators receive positive
rents, consumers are also receiving surplus in the form of the diﬀerence between
the utility of their consumption ﬂow, and the cost of renting (or buying) the good,
ptct (or q0k0). Furthermore, the ﬁrst welfare theorem implies this is the socially
eﬃcient allocation of the surplus between innovators, imitators and consumers.
3.2. The Decision to Create. Consider, then, the problem faced by a competi-
tive innovator before the innovative eﬀort is undertaken. After the innovation has
occurred, the representative innovator has, say, k units of the new product that he
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for q0k = v0(k)k, which may be interpreted as the rent accruing to the ﬁxed fac-
tor owned by the innovative entrepreneur(s). The market value of the innovation
corresponds, therefore, to the market value of the ﬁrst unit of the new product.
This equals, in turn, the net discounted value of the future stream of consumption
services it generates. Introducing those ﬁrst k units of the new good entails some
cost C > 0 for the innovator, say in terms of leisure foregone while inventing or
because some other goods need to be purchased to carry out the innovation process
that leads to the prototypes. Consequently, the innovation will be produced if and
only if the cost of creating the innovation is less than or equal to the rent resulting
from the innovation and captured by the ﬁxed factor, C ≤ q0k.
The reader may suspect that something dubious hides behind the fact that we
are not modeling explicitly the process through which the prototypes are created,
and how the amount k is chosen. This is not the case. Imagine that, in the period
before t = 0 the representative innovator is endowed with some resources, say L
units of time, which can be used in the production of a basket of existing goods
and earn a wage w. Let the production function of the prototypes be k = I(l) for
l ≥ l, and k = 0 for l < l, with l ≤ L representing the indivisibility mentioned in
section 2. Taking the market value q0 of the initial copies as given, a competitive




Then, as long as δq0I0(l) ≥ w holds, the representative innovator sets δq0I0(l∗) = w
and brings k = I(l∗) prototypes of the new good to the market, at a (sunk) cost
of C = wl∗. The case in which δq0I0(l) ≥ w does not hold, i.e. the indivisibility is
binding, is important and will be considered next. Obviously, this is just one partic-
ular formulation of the R&D production function. An alternative, and appealing,





novator can produce at most one prototype at an opportunity cost of wi, with the
latter increasing in i. In this case, the “marginal innovator” I∗ is determined by the
equality δv0(I∗) = wI∗. In general, as long as the expected C is smaller than the
expected revenue δq0k from selling the prototypes, competitive innovation makes
perfect sense. This should also explain our insistence, in the previous section, on
the dramatic need for empirical studies determining what the opportunity cost of
innovators would be under NIP and competition.
A less obvious question is: What happens as β, the rate at which copies can
be made, increases? If, for example, the advent of the Internet makes it possible
to put vastly more copies than in the past in the hands of consumers in any given
time interval, what would happen to innovations? Observe that
∂q0









When β is suﬃciently large relative to ζ the ﬁrst term will dominate. For con-
creteness, consider the case of full depreciation, ζ = 0. In this case the rent will
increase if initial-period consumption falls with β and will decrease if it rises. In
other words, the relevant question is whether consumptions are substitutes or com-
plements between time periods. If they are substitutes, then increasing β lowers
the cost of consuming after the ﬁrst period and causes ﬁrst period consumption
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This will increase the rent to the ﬁxed factor and improve the chances that the
innovation will take place. Conversely, if there is complementarity in consumption
between periods, the reduced cost in subsequent periods will increase ﬁrst-period
consumption of the product and lower the rent.
3.3. Elasticity of Demand. It is instructive to consider the simple, even if ex-
treme, case in which the utility function has the CES form u(c) = − 1
θc−θ, θ > −1. In
this case, it is possible to explicitly compute the optimal consumption/production
plan. Consider ﬁrst the case of inelastic demand, where θ > 0. Here there is little
substitutability between periods and a calculation shows that as β → ∞ initial
consumption increases toward an upper bound, which is nevertheless smaller than
the initial stock of prototypes. Consequently, rents from innovation fall, but not
toward zero. Competitive innovation still takes place if pc = u0(c)c > C.
More relevant is the case of elastic demand, where θ ∈ (−1,0). This implies a
high elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption. In this case, utility
becomes unbounded above as β increases toward a high, but ﬁnite, value. The latter
details is a particular feature of the CES function form we are considering, and is
not essential. What is essential, and general, is that with elastic demand revenues
to the creator increase as β increases. The case of elastic demand is especially
signiﬁcant, because it runs so strongly against conventional wisdom: as the rate of
reproduction increases, the competitive rents increase, despite the fact that over
time many more copies of the new good are reproduced and distributed. The basic
assumption is simply that demand for the new product is elastic.
Many people may ﬁnd the idea that demand for new ideas is, at least initially,
elastic not as “realistic” and “relevant” as we think it is. Indeed, some academic
commentators of our work, e.g. Klein, Lerner and Murphy (2002), have made
exactly this point. These critics quickly dismiss our assumption as “unrealistic”
pointing out that, obviously, demand cannot be elastic because, otherwise, monop-
olists would be lowering prices until the point of unitary elasticity is reached. Hence,
they conclude, if demand were elastic ineﬃciency would not be an issue even under
IP; further, because monopolists do not seem to be lowering prices all that much
in markets for, e.g., recorded music, then demand is certainly not elastic. This
criticism, even if “obvious”, is actually incorrect, both as a matter of elementary
theory and of publicly available data. As we all learned in college, demand elasticity
alone matters only when marginal cost is zero. In the general case with positive
marginal cost, what matters is whether marginal revenue is bigger than marginal
cost (so the monopolist wants to expand output) or smaller (so he wants to reduce
it). Hence you would expect monopolists to produce where marginal revenue is
equal to marginal cost, and this provides information about demand elasticity if we
know something about marginal costs. Without going too far from the case often
mentioned as “dramatic” should a NIP regime be adopted, we can try to ﬁgure
out what the numbers say for music CDs. For music producers it is clearly not
the case that marginal cost is zero. We have fairly precise data for the European
music market (and we are willing to bet the data for the US market are similar).
Over continental Europe, the ﬁnal consumer price is of about 19 Euros per CD,
which breaks down, roughly, like this: 7.6 euros to the music producers, 7.6 euros
to the retailers, 3.8 euros for the intermediary distributors. From the viewpoint of
the monopolist copyright holder the sum of the last two, 11.4 euros, is marginal
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to pay the musicians some money, and has to produce and wrap the CD. Again,
according to European data, this is about 1.8 euros. Hence, marginal cost (MC)
is between 11.4 and 13.2, while price (P) is equal to 19. We know that, denoting






In the case at hand, this gives ε between −2.64 and −3.27, depending on which
value you take for MC. Demand is clearly elastic, and this should not be a surprise
to anyone who buys music, or books, or DVDs! A similar exercise with books will
get you a similar result; we leave it to the reader to guess what the result would
be if we repeated the calculations for medicines, especially the truly innovative and
important ones. That is why we claim that “elastic demand” is the empirically
obvious and relevant case for creative works.
3.4. A Few Extensions.
3.4.1. Inelastic demand and satiation. There is plentiful evidence that in practice
the indivisibility of ideas is not more substantial than that of other commodities,
for example, automobile plants or shipyards. There is also much evidence that
ideas ﬂourish in competitive markets without government intervention in the form
of patents and copyright. However, for books, music and movies, it is easy to
imagine that changes in computer technology that make copying cheaper and more
rapid will lead to a β so large as to cause kt to expand so rapidly as to ﬂood
the market and drive price to zero rather quickly. We just argued that this is
not, indeed, very realistic and that, under elastic demand, this would not hurt the
innovator. However, let us assume, for the sake of the argument, that demand for
the idea becomes rapidly inelastic and that some satiation point is reached where
the market price at which copies can be sold is close to zero. It is worth noting
that the same technological change is reducing the cost of books, music, and movies
creation as well, so that C is also decreasing quite rapidly, and this may well oﬀset
the improved copying technology. Moreover, even if we accept that the market
for copies may be quickly ﬂooded, there are still tremendous advantages in being
ﬁrst. We will not attempt to enumerate those all of those advantages here. In
the case of innovations, secrecy is an obvious method of generating a short-term
monopoly. In the case of books and movies, most sales take place within three
months of initial release. So if it is possible to keep copies encrypted for even so
short a period of time, substantial revenues may be realized regardless of the quality
of copying technology. Overwhelming empirical evidence from the pharmaceutical
industry suggests that the ﬁrst mover advantage is quite substantial, be it due to
reputation eﬀects, slow information diﬀusion, or simply “capture” of the medical
profession. In any case, the evidence shows that most generic drugs, selling at a
quarter of the price and being clinically and functionally perfect substitutes for the
original products, never capture more than 50% of the market (Caves et al (1991),
Congressional Budget Oﬃce (1998)).
3.4.2. First Mover Advantage. The ﬁrst mover advantage is a form of monopoly
accruing to the original innovator. A monopolist, unlike a competitor, will not allow
quantity kt to expand until the satiation point (or the inelastic portion of demand)
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value, the one that maximizes his revenues. This case does nothing but reinforce
our point: an innovator who is really unique and, therefore, a natural monopolist
for the ﬁrst few periods will earn even more than the competitive one studied in
the earlier part of this section. Hence, for this individual, the indivisibility C will




he will not take the initial price q0 as given, but instead recognize that q0 = v0(k0 =
I(l)). As a monopolist he can manipulate q0 by appropriately choosing l, as he is the
only producer of k0, i.e. the only supplier of the specially skilled labor l. Clearly,
the initial number of prototypes chosen by the monopolist, call it kM
0 = I(lM),
will be strictly less than the one chosen under competition, k0 = I(l∗) , hence
socially ineﬃcient. Nevertheless, this ineﬃciency, apart from being unavoidable, is
also small in a NIP regime, as free competition, and faster reproduction of copies,
will set in right after the ﬁrst period. As we show below the “legal” (should we say
“un-natural”?) monopolist created by the IP regime, will instead restrict supply
in all periods, keeping the price too high and the allocation away from the eﬃcient
one for the indeﬁnite future.
3.4.3. Indivisibility. We have seen how under some circumstances there may be
underprovision of ideas due to indivisibility. This is due to the fact that, when
the indivisibility C is particularly large and the marginal utility of the new idea
is rapidly decreasing C > q0k may obtain. In this case the traditional notion
of competitive equilibrium would not do, equilibrium may not even exist and the
second welfare theorem may fail: there are allocations that are socially optimal and
require creation to take place, but cannot be achieved by the traditional price taking
arrangement of competitive equilibrium. This is a diﬃcult problem, that economic
theorists have too long ignored and about which little is known; we cannot even
attempt to address it here, hence we will recognize its existence and add just a
few remarks.1 The ﬁrst is empirical: how relevant is the case C > q0k in practice?
Because the competitive analsys of innovation has been happily ignored so far, no
one has any reasonable idea. At least, no one has a reasonable idea based on a
systematic analysis of real world data. Our prior is that this is not a very frequent
case, i.e. that most innovations are of an incremental nature and, even if they
imply an indivisibility, the latter is very seldom large compared to the size of the
market. Casual observation suggests that very large aggregate indivisibilities occurr
a lot less often than one may think. Consider the size of some very big ideas: The
Manhattan Project (1942-1945) cost $7 billion per year in 1996 USD; GDP in 1944-
1945 was about $1700 billion per year in 1996 USD, hence the Manhattan Project
cost approximately 0.4% of GDP. The overall operating budget of NASA (1962-73)
runs at about $18 billion per year in 2000 USD; the Apollo project was about 1/3
of it. In 2000 USD, the GDP of the USA in 1968 was about $3,700 billion, implying
that landing on the moon cost approximately 0.15% of GDP. Notice that these are
all ideas ﬁnanced by the public purse, so let us now turn to the really relevant
ones, those ﬁnanced by private entrepreneurs under the IP regime. The famous
big movies “The Titanic” and the “Lord of the Rings” cost $200 million each in
1The interested reader should consult Boldrin and Levine (1999), (2004b) and (2004c) for a
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1997 USD; DiMasi et al [1991] estimate the average cost of bringing a new drug to
market at $231 million 1987 USD, including clinical trials (which are a public good).
Hence, privately ﬁnanced ideas have an indivisibility that is, at most, 1/10,000 of
US GDP. Our own empirical analysis, see Boldrin and Levine (2004c), suggests
that, at least in the case of ﬁctional novels, the size of C, i.e. the opportunity cost
of the eﬀort required to write one novel for the marginal writer, hardly exceeds $
60,000 in 2004 USD; a miniscule amount indeed. Finally, the proverbial cherry on
the top of the pie: we are all familiar with the “Genoma Project” and the fact
that, because its indivisibility was so large, it had to be ﬁnanced by the public
purse. Still, we are also all aware that, in spite of the public project to be already
underway and, hence, in spite of the fact that the most of the (de)coding of the
human genoma was going to be in the public domain, a relatively little private
entrepreneur was able to pay for that large indivisibility, recover it, and make a
non negligible proﬁt by competing against the public enterprise. From this we can
safely conclude that, at least for the idea called “human genoma”, the marginal
utility of copies must not be rapidly decreasing.
Our second remark is admittedly more speculative. It says that, while traditional
price taking behavior may not work when C is too large, other competitive arrange-
ments, such as contingent bids, contracts that mimic lotteries on the delivery of
the idea, “innovation clubs”, and a number of yet unexplored and nontraditional
tools that creative and competitive entrepreneurs can come up with, may well do
the trick in most cases. This is a line of investigation that has been very seldom
pursued, hence we cannot do anything more than conjecture that it is a fruitful
terrain for future research. The traditional solution to this problem is, instead, IP:
the government provision of monopoly through patents and copyright. That is, by
granting control over how all copies of an idea are used, the government allows the
patent or copyright holder to limit reproduction and restrict supply. This increases
proﬁts, and so provides a greater incentive to create or innovate. Our investigation,
instead, suggests that more IP does more harm than good.
3.4.4. Rent seeking. One of the key problems with government grants of monopoly
is the rent-seeking it induces. That is, when governments give away monopolies,
there is incentive for would-be monopolists to waste resources competing for the
award. In the case of intellectual monopolies, the resources wasted by competing
“would be monopolists” takes several forms. The most widely studied is the patent
race, where too much eﬀort is invested in innovating quickly in order to be the
ﬁrst to get the patent. Another classical problem is the eﬀort wasted building
“work alike” innovations in order to get a portion of the monopoly. This is the
case, for example, in textbooks, where every textbook is just diﬀerent enough from
the best-seller in the ﬁeld to avoid violating the copyright. It is also the case in
pharmaceuticals, where more time and eﬀort is spent developing copycat drugs to
get the share of a lucrative market, than is spent developing genuinely new drugs.
One of the worst aspects of public rent seeking is the regulatory capture or
“monopoly creep” it induces. In the case of regulation, it has been observed that
over time the regulatory agency becomes captured by the regulated industry, and
far from imposing the public interest on the industry, serves instead to enable
collusion and monopolistic practices within the industry. Similarly, in the case of
patents and copyrights, over time both the scope and duration of monopoly power
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has risen in the USA, for example, from 28 years to 95 years; and many areas of
thriving innovation not traditionally subject to patents, such as business practices,
are now patentable. So while in a theoretical sense, it might be desirable to have
copyrights and patents lasting a few months or a few years, as a practical matter,
once copyrights and patents are allowed at all, their term and scope is likely to
begin to creep upwards.
The existence of public rent seeking is not to say that there is not private rent
seeking as well. For example, in the absence of patents, innovators are likely to
increase their reliance on trade secrecy. Indeed, one argument for patents is that it
replaces trade-secrecy, and forces innovators to reveal the secrets of their inventions.
Unfortunately, as anyone who has read a patent will realize, the “secret”, if there
is one, is rarely revealed in a useful way in the patent application. Moreover, since
patents last 20 years, the only reason to get a patent is if the inventor thinks he
cannot keep the secret for that long. We have studied this issue in Boldrin and
Levine (2004a), showing that creating public rent seeking is not a good way to
solve the problem of private rent seeking.
3.5. Creation Under Monopoly. What, ﬁnally, if we are in the IP regime and
the initial innovator is a legal monopolist, independently of there being one or more
simultaneous innovators? What, in other words, if one of the innovators is, in force
of IP laws, granted patent or copyrights over the idea, and all its future copies?












subject to the constraints that k0 = I(l), kt+1 ≤ βkt − ct + ζct . It is trivial to see
that the solution to this problem implies: (i) the initial quantity kM
0 < k0, where
the latter is the competitive solution and the former the monopolistic one, hence
(ii) cM
t < ct, meaning less consumption and welfare in each period. Further, under
general assumptions on the utility function u(c), there exists a level cM < ∞ at
which the monopolist maximizes his long run proﬁts. Once this point is reached,
the monopolist has no incentive to let reproduction to continue, and will use its IP
power to maintain the stock of copies of ideas at the level βkM+(ζ−1)cM, instead of
letting it grow unbounded as in the NIP allocation. Much less social welfare under
IP than under NIP, not just in the short but also in the very long run. Further,
imagine the particular idea we are considering can be used, when a suﬃcient stock
is accumulated, to create a new idea that reduces the cost of producing additional
consumption but cannot reduce the cost of increasing the current level, and so on
as additional ideas are created. That is, assume we have a ladder of ever better
ideas, feeding on each other and reducing the cost of increasing the production
of additional units of the consumption good. The monopolist will not choose to
innovate because any investment to do so must necessarily reduce current-period
revenues below the maximum, while it cannot raise revenue in any future period.
Similarly, the monopolist will not allow anyone else to innovate. If this reminds you
of the state of our telephone service industry in the long decades before the ATT
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4. The Standard Model Examined
Supporters of IP like to use another model of innovation, one that, in the present
context, is equivalent to the extreme case in which there is not an indivisibility, but
a ﬁxed cost in the innovation technology, and in which the parameter β in the
reproduction technology is equal to inﬁnity. That is, the creator puts resources
equal to C into the innovative process, generates a new idea but the later is not
embodied in anything the creator can actually control, be it either her human
capital, a prototype of the good, or a master record. The idea, instead, is somehow
published in the daily newspaper, or showed on free access TVs, and everyone
can readily learn it and copy it. Conventional wisdom in economics is that IP
environments are necessary in this setting to recover ﬁxed costs. With demand
that is perfectly elastic up to an upper bound, there is no cost of monopoly, so this
would seem the ideal environment to impose IP restrictions. Our goal is to point out
that this is correct only if it is not possible to produce similar items – for example
textbooks that are suﬃciently diﬀerent to be entitled to a separate copyright, but
suﬃciently similar as to make no diﬀerence to consumers. When there are many
ﬁrms competing for monopoly rents, and market conditions are such that rents can
be obtained even with some degree of competition, the rent seeking behavior of
competing monopolists dissipates the social surplus by overproduction of too many
similar items. IP does better than NIP when there is one ﬁrm, but not when there
are many. Moreover, consider allowing consumers to submit contingent bids. This
allows the recovery of ﬁxed costs even when there is a single ﬁrm, so NIP does no
worse than IP in this case. With many ﬁrms and contingent bids, NIP essentially
always does better than IP.
4.1. One Firm. Begin by considering a ﬁrm that faces a ﬁxed cost F < 1 and
can produce unlimited quantities at marginal cost zero. There are many identical
risk neutral consumers; at a price of one or less, taken together they demand one
unit; and will purchase nothing at price higher than one. In addition consumers
who make a purchase can themselves produce additional units at a marginal cost
of ε ≥ 0. This can represent the fact that consumers have access to an inferior
reproduction technology, that consumers have a preference for buying from the
original producer, or that in a setting where production takes time, as in section 3,
the seller of the original unit can claim a possibly substantial rent.
We consider two legal environments: one in which consumers are prohibited
from reselling, which we refer to as the IP environment; and one in which down-
stream licensing agreements are not legally enforceable, which we refer to as the
NIP environment.
4.1.1. IP environment. We ﬁrst suppose that consumers are legally prohibited from
reselling units, either by an explicit law, or by enforcement of licensing agreements
that prohibit resale. In this case, the monopolist will produce one unit at a price
of one, covering the ﬁxed cost and leading to a Pareto eﬃcient outcome.
4.1.2. NIP environment. Next we suppose that licensing agreements that prohibit
resale are not legally enforceable. In this case, competition among consumers will
force the price to p = ε. If ε ≥ F the ﬁrm will produce one unit, and again the
outcome will be Pareto eﬃcient. If ε < F the ﬁrm will not produce and the outcome
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4.1.3. IP and NIP with contingent oﬀers. The contractual environments considered
so far exclude the important possibility that consumers may submit contingent bids
prior to production. We consider only symmetric equilibria in which all consumers
submit the same contingent bid. In the copyright environment this makes no diﬀer-
ence: the monopolist has no reason to accept contingent bids for less than 1 since
he will be able to sell at a price of 1 to anyone whose bid he does not accept. In
the no copyright environment in which ε ≥ F contingent bids make no diﬀerence
for the same reason – the monopolist will be able to sell at a price of ε to anyone
whose bid he does not accept, and cannot sell at a higher price. However, when
ε < F in the NIP environment it makes a substantial diﬀerence: if all consumers
bid F for their share of the market, the good will be produced. No higher price
will clear the market, since consumers could bid less, and their bid would still be
accepted. However, if any consumer bids less than F no bids will be accepted and
the good will not be produced, so each consumer is decisive, and this is in fact a
subgame perfect equilibrium. Hence, with contingent oﬀers, the NIP environment
implements the ﬁrst best. In this case the eﬃciency of IP and NIP are the same,
although NIP creates a substantial transfer from producers to consumers.
4.2. Many Firms. Now suppose that there are many identical ﬁrms that produce
perfect substitutes, all using the technology described above.
4.2.1. IP environment. Let p(n) be the post-entry price when n ﬁrms have chosen
to enter the market. As a simple model of post-entry competition, suppose that
p(n) = min{1,(1−α(n))nF +α(n)}, where α(n) > 0. That is, the post-entry price
lies between the price needed to recover costs and the monopoly price in a way that
depends on the number of ﬁrms. In this case entry will occur until n is so large that
(n + 1)F > 1, while nF ≤ 1. For convenience let us suppose that there is actually
an n = 1
F ; then this will be the equilibrium number of ﬁrms, and the social surplus
will be zero, as the beneﬁt to consumers will equal to the cost of production. This
particular form of competition results in what we can describe as the Pareto worst
outcome.
4.2.2. NIP environment. As in the case of one producer, the price will still be ε. If
ε < F there will still be no output and no social surplus. Otherwise the number of
ﬁrms will be such that (n + 1)F > ε and nF ≤ ε. Assuming that there is actually
an n = ε
F this will be the equilibrium number of ﬁrms, and the social surplus will
be 1−ε. This gives a reversal of the one ﬁrm result: without licensing social surplus
is never lower and sometimes higher in NIP than in IP.
4.2.3. IP and NIP with contingent oﬀers. With contingent bids and many ﬁrms
there is a coordination problem because consumer must decide which producers to
submit their bids to. After bids are submitted, let us suppose that ﬁrms are ordered
by the number of bids they receive, and let b(i) be the number of bids received by
ﬁrm i. We assume that these are ﬁxed numbers, and that b(i + 1) < b(i). We
assume that all consumers submit identical bids, so
P
i b(i) = 1.
Consider the NIP case ﬁrst. Suppose that ε < F, all consumers bid p where
b(1)p + (1 − b(1))ε = F. Then the ﬁrst producer exactly recovers production costs
by accepting all bids and selling to the remaining consumers at the price ε. No other
producer can earn a proﬁt by entering. Consumers’ expected utility is exactly F
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bids less than p the good is not produced at all, and he is strictly worse oﬀ. Finally,
there is no equilibrium with a higher value of p since then each consumer could bid
less and still have the bid accepted.
Next, look at the IP environment. If b(1) = 1 so there is no coordination problem,
then it is an equilibrium for all consumers to bid F and the ﬁrst best is obtained.
Suppose, however, that (n+1)F > 1, while nF < 1, so that the equilibrium without
contingent bids is strict. Since there can be no more than n ﬁrms producing in any
equilibrium, regardless of whether ﬁrms accept or reject bids, the eﬀect on demand
is at most nb(1). Consequently if b(1) is small enough the equilibrium number of
ﬁrms will remain at n and the equilibrium with contingent bids will be essentially
the same as the equilibrium without contingent bids, and similarly ineﬃcient.
In summary, even in this extreme and fairly unrealistic environment, and even
under the strong assumptions of perfect information and identical consumers the
only case in which IP does better than NIP is with a single producer and no
contingent bids. With contingent bids, NIP does at most ε worse than IP, and,
when there are many ﬁrms and a severe coordination problem among consumers,
NIP does substantially better than IP.
4.3. Sequential innovation. Here we summarize a simple result, ﬁrst reported
in Boldrin and Levine (2005a) and then extended and fully analyzed in Boldrin
and Levine (2005b). The basic intuition is much older than our modeling, as its
name, “we are sitting on the shoulders of giants”, reveals, and its application to the
problem of optimal IP was already discussed, albeit informally, in, e.g., Scotchmer
(1991).
Suppose that to create a new idea requires the use of N existing ideas. Assume
the cost of producing a copy of each of these ideas is ε
N. Under IP the value of
the new idea for a monopolistic creator is ρ, while under NIP a competitive creator
gets only φρ, with 0 < φ < 1. With NIP, there will be many copies of each of these
existing ideas competing with each other, and the inventor can obtain all N of
them for a total cost of ε. Without government intervention, this socially desirable
invention will take place, provided only that φρ ≥ ε.
Assume IP applies to the N old ideas as well as the new, and that the owners
of the old ideas only know that ρ is drawn from a uniform distribution over [0,ρ].
Each sets a price pi to license her invention. Then, if owners of all the other existing
ideas are setting the price p, each owner of an existing idea receives an expected
revenue of
ρ − (N − 1)p − pi
ρ
pi
If 2ε < ρ the Nash equilibrium of this game is at p =
ρ
N+1, and therefore the
inventor must pay
Nρ
N+1 to acquire all the N licenses. Therefore, only if the value
of the new idea satisﬁes ρ >
Nρ
N+1 will the potential new creator be able to acquire
all N licenses and move forward with creation. This occurs with probability 1
1+N,
implying that under IP the probability of creation goes to zero as its complexity
(number of licenses required) increases. By way of contrast. under NIP the prob-
ability of innovation is 1 − ε
φρ, which is independent of the number of required
inputs.
The moral is simple: as N → ∞ the additional incentive for innovation under an
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it imposes on innovation. As technologies grow more and more complex, requiring
more and more specialized inputs, the monopoly power induced by patents and
copyright becomes more and more socially damaging.
5. Superstars
The phenomenon of superstardom was deﬁned by Rosen (1981, p. 845) as a situ-
ation “wherein relatively small numbers of people earn enormous amounts of money
and dominate the activities in which they engage.” Its puzzling aspect derives from
the fact that, more often than not, the perceivable extent to which a superstar is
a better performer or produces a better good than the lesser members of the same
trade is very tiny. Is superstardom due to some kind of monopoly power, and would
it disappear in a competitive environment?
Our theory shows that when there are indivisibilities, technological advances in
the reproduction of “information goods” may lead to superstardom, even under
perfect competition. Hence, our model predicts that superstars should abound in
industries where the main product is information, which can be cheaply reproduced
and distributed on a massive scale. Such is the case for the worlds of sport, enter-
tainment, and arts and letters, which coincides with the penetrating observations
(p. 845) that motivated Rosen’s original contribution.
For simplicity, we consider a world in which all consumption takes place in a
single period, but our results extend directly to an intertemporal environment.
There are two kinds of consumption goods. The ﬁrst is the information good we
concentrate upon, while the second can be interpreted as a basket of all pre-existing
goods. Speciﬁcally, we assume utility of the form u(c)+m, where c is the information
good. There are two kinds of potential producers, A and B, each with a single unit
of labor. The two producers are equally skilled at producing the second good: a
unit of labor produces a unit of the second good. However, A produces information
goods that are of a slightly higher quality than those produced by B. To be precise,
we assume that one unit of type A labor can produce (1+ε)β units of good c, while
one unit of type B labor can produce β units of good c.
This case, without indivisibility, does not admit superstars, in the sense that
the price of type A labor must be exactly 1 + ε the price of type B labor. Since
type A labor is more eﬃcient at producing the information good, type B labor will
be used in the information sector only after all type A labor is fully employed in
that sector. Suppose that this is the case. Let `2 denote the amount of type B
labor employed in the information sector. Then, the equilibrium condition is simply
βu0(β(1+ε)+β`2) = 1. If u0(c) is eventually inelastic, then `2 must fall as β rises,
and producer B will be forced out of the information good market. However, with
good 2 as numeraire, it will always be the case that B will earn 1 and A will earn
1 + ε.
With an indivisibility, however, the situation is quite diﬀerent. Suppose that it
costs a ﬁxed amount C to operate in the information good market at all. When
`2 falls below C producer B no longer ﬁnds it proﬁtable to participate in the
information goods market and drops out entirely. This occurs when βu0(β(1+ε)+
βC) = 1. In this case producer B of course continues to earn 1. However, prices
in the information goods market now jump to βu0(β(1 + ε)), and producer A now
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The argument can easily be generalized to a dynamic setting with capital accu-
mulation, endogenous labor supply, and so forth. It shows quite starkly that, under
very common circumstances, the simplest kind of technological progress may have a
non-monotone and non-homogeneous impact on the wage rate of diﬀerent kinds of
labor. Our model predicts that continuing improvements in the technology for re-
producing “information goods” have a non-monotone impact on wages and income
inequality among producers of such goods. Initially, technological improvements
are beneﬁcial to everybody and the real wage increases at a uniform rate for all
types of labor. Eventually, though, further improvements in the reproduction tech-
nology lead to a “crowding out” of the least eﬃcient workers. When the process is
taken to its natural limit, this kind of technological change has a disproportionate
eﬀect on the best workers. For large values of β, the superstar captures the whole
market and has earnings that are no longer proportionate to the quality of the good
it produces or its skill diﬀerentials, which are only slightly better than average.
To an external observer the transition between the two regimes may suggest a
momentous change in one or more of the underlying fundamentals. In particular,
one may be lead to conclude that the observed change in the dynamics of skill premia
is due either to a shift from neutral to “skill biased” technological progress, or to
a dramatic variation in the relative supply of the two kinds of labor, or, ﬁnally,
to large changes in the skill diﬀerentials of the two groups. These are the main
interpretations that a large body of recent literature has advanced to understand
the evolution of wages during the last twenty-ﬁve years. While one or more of these
explanations may well be relevant, our simple example shows it needs not be and,
we would argue, it certainly is not for those sectors in which “information goods”
are produced. We ﬁnd the explanation outlined here not only simpler but also,
plainly, more realistic.
Our point of view puts at the center stage the working of competitive forces when
there is indivisibility and the unavoidable consequences of the law of comparative
advantages. Our theory predicts that even very small skill diﬀerentials can be
greatly magniﬁed by the easiness with which information can be reproduced and
distributed. It also predicts that the increased reproducibility of information will
continue generating large income disparities among individuals of very similar skills
and in a growing number of industries.
6. Debating Common Fallacies
Common legal, and often economic, wisdom argues that competitive markets are
not suitable for trading copies of ideas, as ideas are intrinsically diﬀerent from other
economic commodities. For the most part these arguments are incorrect. Along
most dimensions, ideas are not diﬀerent form other commodities, and those few
dimensions along which ideas are diﬀerent do not generally aﬀect the functioning of
competitive markets. Here are some often-heard arguments, which we have shown
to be fallacious.
It is argued that in competitive markets innovators would be unable to appropriate
more than an inﬁnitesimal share of the social value of their ideas. This is a recur-
rent theme in much business, managerial, and industrial organization literature,
where it is apparently believed that economic eﬃciency requires innovators (or pro-
ducers more generally, we would believe) to appropriate all the social value of their
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social surplus is realized would be ineﬃcient as producers are “leaving something
on the table”, to consumers in fact. But, obviously, socially eﬃcient provision of
ideas/goods requires, instead, that all ideas/goods with a positive social surplus
(i.e. social value larger or at most equal than social cost) be produced. How such
surplus is split between producers, consumers, and other entities (suppliers of inter-
mediate inputs, government, etcetera) may, and in general will, aﬀect if all goods
with positive social surplus are produced, but there is no general presumption that
too few goods will be created unless producers appropriate the whole social sur-
plus. In general, in fact, we would expect producers to bring goods, or ideas, to the
market, as long as the private costs of doing so are exceeded by the private gains.
Hence, from a social perspective, one should ask: for all ideas with a positive so-
cial surplus, is it the case that competitive pricing allows producers to appropriate
enough revenues to compensate for their opportunity cost? Strangely enough, this
question is seldom asked in the theoretical literature on innovations, and never, to
the best of our knowledge, in the empirical one. This fallacy, as we have shown in
Section 3, misses the fact that ideas combine attributes of both consumption and
capital goods. They can be used directly for consumption, such as reading a book,
or watching a movie, or they can be used as an input in production, by making
copies of a book or movie, or by producing other goods, for example, by using
the idea for an improved production process. That the original copy of an idea is
the capital good (the tree) from which all other copies (the fruits) must originate
enables innovators to appropriate the net present value of all future copies through
competitive pricing. Corn seeds, for example, can be eaten or used for producing
additional corn, so also combine characteristics of consumption and capital goods.
Competitive markets for corn generate the appropriate incentive to invest in corn
seed. The initial copy (or copies, when simultaneous innovation occurs) of an idea is
generally produced through a process which is diﬀerent from the one used to make
subsequent copies, as in the case of original research versus teaching. Most capital
goods (original research) are used to produce commodities other than themselves
– but the fact that capital goods might be used to reproduce themselves poses no
particular problem for competitive markets. In the semi-conductor industry, for
example, reduction in chip size makes it possible to construct capital equipment
that can be used to produce even smaller chips.
There are suggestions that ideas are subject to “spillover externalities”, or what
we might call informational leakage. That is, the existence of the idea enables
people to learn it and make use of it without the permission of the owners. Some
even argue that ideas can be copied for free. In practice, few ideas are subject
to informational leakage, and in all cases are costly to reproduce. In the case of
copyrightable creations, where the ideas are embodied in physical objects such as
books, informational leakage is not an issue. In the case of scientiﬁc advances,
reﬂection shows that it is also not the case. While in some sense scientiﬁc ideas are
widely available, usable copies of scientiﬁc ideas are not so easy to come by. Even
Newton’s laws, our example in Section 2, require a substantial amount of time and
eﬀort to understand. For all practical purposes copies are limited to those people
who understand the laws and books that explain them. Without paying someone
to teach you or buying a book that explains Newton’s laws, you are not terribly
likely to learn them merely because they are in the public domain. As teachers and
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in doing so creating new copies of them. Overwhelming historical evidence shows
that diﬀusion and adoption of innovations is costly and time consuming.
Leaving ideas in the public domain, as it would be the case under a NIP system,
is socially ineﬃcient and leads to a “tragedy of the commons” for creative activity.
Although legal scholars have tended to view the public domain as a commons,
like the atmosphere or ocean for which there are no property rights, in fact the
market for a public domain book is very similar to the market for wheat or any
other competitively provided good or service. Once copyright has expired, there
are many copies of a book, each a good substitute for the other, and each owned
by someone. If you want to read the book, make copies, or turn it into a movie,
you must ﬁrst buy the book from one of the current owners. If there are many
owners, each competing with each other to sell you the book, you may be able to
obtain it relatively cheaply, even though you intend to turn it into a highly valued
movie. But the fact that you can buy ingredients cheaply is a good consequence of
competitive markets, not a bad one. In fact, the evidence suggests that the market
for goods in the public domain functions well, with copies widely available and
reasonably priced: ﬁnding a copy of a book by Dickens, for example, is no great
problem.
Lawyers have also made other arguments, based on the “public domain is like
the commons” fallacy, as to why ideas might be diﬀerent from other goods; but
many of these arguments reﬂect lack of understanding of how markets function.
For example, it is often argued that without the monopoly provided by copyright,
there would be an inadequate incentive to “promote” works such as books, music
and movies, since the beneﬁt of the promotional eﬀort would be shared by com-
petitors. However, this argument applies equally well to other competitive markets,
such as that for wheat. The point to understand is that under monopoly, goods
are priced high, and the consumer receives little beneﬁt. Hence the monopolist has
an incentive to subsidize information to the consumer. In competitive markets, the
competitors do not have incentive to subsidize information, so consumers must pay
the cost of obtaining it. Information about wheat is widely available – from doctors,
diet advisers, books, magazines, and many other sources – but not directly from
wheat producers. In competitive markets, not only is information widely avail-
able, but it is less biased than the subsidized information provided by monopolists.
Markets for ideas are no diﬀerent in this respect. Plentiful information is available
about works in the public domain – but that information is not generally provided
by book publishers.
7. Conclusions
While the functioning of competition in the market for goods has been the subject
of study for a long time, and our knowledge of the subject appears to have pro-
gressed substantially since the times of Adam Smith, it is often felt that the same
is not true of the market for ideas. Indeed, there is a widespread view that ideas
are dramatically and intrinsically diﬀerent from goods and that the “economics of
knowledge” needs to be grounded on diﬀerent premises and adopt diﬀerent model-
ing strategies than the rest of economics. In our work we reconsidered this issue and
concluded that, while the economic theory of ideas does require modiﬁcations in
some of the more common assumptions with which markets for regular commodities
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prima facie, and that a great deal of common economic wisdom applies equally well
to the economics of knowledge. This allows us to critically reconsider a number of
theoretical issues sitting at the intersection between the theory of innovation and
technological change and growth and trade theory, to conclude that much “new
common wisdom” (otherwise known as “new growth theory” or, in its extreme ver-
sion, “new economy”) is either empirically groundless or logically faulty, and that
some old, and possibly uncommon, wisdom, should be brought back to bear on
the study of technological change, growth, and trade. Central to understanding
the market for ideas and the incentives for the adoption of new ideas is discovering
how ideas might be diﬀerent from other goods. The starting point of the economic
analysis of innovation is to recognize that the economically relevant unit is a copy
of an idea. That is, typically, many copies of an idea exist in physical form, such as
a book, a computer ﬁle or a piece of equipment, or in the form of knowledge em-
bodied in people who know and understand the idea. When embodied in humans,
copies of ideas are labeled with a variety of diﬀerent names, which often obscure
their common nature: skills, knowledge, human capital, norms, and so on. Careful
inspection shows, though, that each and everyone of these apparently diﬀerent en-
tities is, at the end, nothing but the embodied copy of an idea, and that the latter
was either discovered ﬁrst by the person in whom it is currently embodied, or costly
acquired (possibly via observation and imitation) from other humans, in whom it
had been previously and similarly embodied. Economically valuable copies of ideas
do not fall from the heavens, like manna, but are the product of intentional and
costly human eﬀorts. Only these copies matter, ﬁrst, in the sense that if they were
all to be erased, the idea would no longer have any economic value, and, second, in
the sense that the copies are relatively good substitutes for each other: whether a
copy of an idea is the original copy or the hundredth copy, it is equally economically
useful. From the perspective of the functioning of markets, then, property rights
in copies of ideas is assured by the ordinary laws against theft – what is ordinarily
referred to as “intellectual property” protects not the ownership of copies of ideas,
but rather a monopoly over how other people make use of their copies of an idea.
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